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In the last decade, the Federal Government and state legislatures have enacted
a plethora of statutes designed to aid and protect the mentally ill in their quest to
become part of America's work force. These statutes are one result of the changes
in society's attitudes toward the mentally ill which have been occurring since this
country was founded over 200 years ago.
The early American colonists brought from Europe a belief that mental illness
was chiefly a form of demoniacal possession, for which the most common methods
of treatment were various forms of torture.' Mentally ill persons who escaped
characterization as witches were classified either as "violent," in which case they
were thrown into prisons and dungeons, or as "harmless," which permitted them
to roam the countryside aimlessly. 2 Shakespeare described these wandering
"Toms o' Bedlam" as follows:
[Pjoor Tom, that eats the swimming frog, the toad, the tadpole, the wall newt and the
water newt, that in the fury of his heart, when the foul fiend rages, eats cow-dung for sallets,
swallows the old rat and the ditch dog, drinks the green mantle of the slimy pool; who is
whipt from tything to tything, and stocked, punished, and imprisoned . . . .
Gradually mentally ill persons began to find themselves in safer, if not ideal,
quarters. The Pennsylvania Hospital, in 1752, was the first American institution
to admit mental patients for the purpose of curative treatment. 4 While this was
quite a stride in the cure and treatment of mentally ill persons, therapeutic
methods were primitive, and the hospitals were abominably maintained. 5 Charles
Dickens, who said many wonderful things about his celebrated trip to America in
the mid- 19th century, was very distressed at what he saw on a visit to a New York
lunatic asylum. Dickens wrote,
I cannot say that I derived much comfort from the inspection of this charity . . . I saw
nothing of that salutary system which had impressed me so favorably elsewhere; and every-
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thing had a lounging, listless, madhouse air which was very painful. The moping idiot,
cowering down with long, dishevelled hair; the gibbering maniac, with his hideous laugh
and pointed finger; the vacant eye, the fierce wild face, the gloomy picking of the hands and
lips with munching of the nails: they were all, without disguise, in naked ugliness and
horror.
6
Tremendous advances in therapeutic equipment and techniques have been
made during the 20th century. 7 Sigmund Freud's teachings influenced various
schools of psychotherapy.8 Additionally, techniques such as occupational therapy
and hydrotherapy assumed important roles in the rehabilitation of the mentally
ill.9 As these treatment advances were being made there was an important attitu-
dinal change toward the mentally ill which was reflected in the replacement of the
custodial ideal by a curative approach to their treatment.10
This article surveys the state and federal legislation which adopts this curative
approach. These statutes are aimed at preventing discrimination, and in some
cases at requiring affirmative action, in the hiring of mentally ill individuals.
Although there has been a surprising lack of litigation over the application and
interpretation of these various statutes, they raise complex issues which often
reflect a progressive and optimistic attitude toward the ability of mentally ill indi-
viduals to become integrated members of society. These issues are worth exam-
ining, if only as another chapter in the relationship between the mentally ill and
the society of which they have only recently become a part.
II
EMPLOYMENT STATUTES PROHIBITING DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
THE MENTALLY ILL: AN OVERVIEW
There are several avenues for instituting employment discrimination suits on
the basis of mental illness."I The primary federal tool for these suits is the 1973
Rehabilitation Act. 12 Twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia have also
enacted statutes protecting the mentally ill from discrimination in employment.' 3
A. 1973 Rehabilitation Act
Two sections of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act deal with the mentally ill: sections
504 and 503. Section 504 is a general antidiscrimination statute prohibiting dis-
crimination against an otherwise qualified handicapped person in programs
6. 1 C. DICKENS, AMERICAN NOTES FOR GENERAL CIRCULATION 221-23 (1842).




11. Other avenues not discussed here include due process, equal protection, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and
arbitration. For an example of due process, see Spencer v. Toussaint, 408 F. Supp. 1067 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
For an example of equal protection and the use of § 1983, see Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 411 F. Supp. 982
(E.D. Pa. 1976), afd, 556 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 923 (1981). For more on arbitra-
tion, see Marmo, The Arbitration ofMental Illness Cases, 31 LAB. L.J. 403 (1980), In re Appleton Elec. Co., 76
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 167 (1981) (Roomkin, Arb.) and In re City of Fenton, 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 355 (1981)
(Roumell, Arb.).
12. 29 U.S.C. § 701-794a (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
13. See infta note 25.
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receiving federal assistance. 14 The section applies to recruiting, hiring, compensa-
tion, job assignments, sick leave, fringe benefits, and "[a]ny other term, condition
or privilege of employment."' 5 Section 503 of the Act applies to federal contrac-
tors with contracts in excess of $2500 and requires the contractor to take affirma-
tive action to employ qualified handicapped individuals. 16
As with any federal statute, there are regulations governing the interpretation
and application of each section.' 7 Regulations under both sections restrict the use
of preemployment inquiries. To comply with section 503, the employer must
review all "mental job qualification requirements to insure that, to the extent
qualification requirements tend to screen out qualified handicapped individuals,
they are job related and are consistent with business necessity and the safe per-
formance of the job."' 18
Section 504 regulations also require that any employment criteria used by a
recipient of federal assistance be job related, and that there be no alternative cri-
teria that screen out fewer handicapped persons.' 9 The regulations provide that a
recipient may not ask an applicant "whether the applicant is a handicapped
person or as to the nature or severity of a handicap. A recipient may, however,
make preemployment inquiry into an applicant's ability to perform job-related
functions."'20 The latter portion of the regulation has been interpreted to mean
that an employer may not ask an applicant if he has ever experienced mental
problems. The applicant, however, can be asked if he is capable of handling cer-
tain emotionally difficult situations. 2'
Regulations under both sections allow preemployment medical examinations
as long as the results are used only in accordance with sections 503 and 504 and all
employees are made to submit to such examinations.2 2 An employer is required to
make reasonable accommodation for its handicapped employees under both sec-
tions unless such accommodation would "impose undue hardship on the operation
of its program. '2 3 In deciding what is undue hardship, factors to be considered
14. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
15. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 84.11(b) (1981); 34 C.F.R. § 104.11(b) (1981).
16. 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
17. Regulations under section 504 are promulgated by each department distributing funds for federal
programs, see 34 C.F.R. §§ 104.1-104.61 (1981) (Dep't of Ed.); 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.1-84.61 (1981) (Dep't of
Health & Human Services), while the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) of the
Department of Labor issues regulations under section 503, see 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-741.1 - .54 (1981).
18. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(c)(1) (1981).
19. 45 C.F.R. § 84.13(a) (1981); 34 C.F.R. § 104.13(a) (1981).
20. 45 C.F.R. § 84.14(a) (1981); 34 C.F.R. § 104.14(a) (1981).
21. Doe v. Syracuse School District, 508 F. Supp. 333, 337 (N.D.N.Y. 1981). In Doe, the plaintiff
applied for a job as a teacher's assistant or substitute teacher. He was asked to complete a vital statistics
form which asked whether he had ever suffered a nervous breakdown or received psychiatric treatment.
The plaintiff responded affirmatively and was denied a job on this ground even though he was examined
and found mentally qualified for the job. The school district admitted that past history of mental
problems was not an indication of the plaintiff's present fitness for the job. The court found that the
defendant had violated section 504 through its preemployment inquiries and granted summary judgment
for the plaintiff.
22. 45 C.F.R. § 84.14(c) (1981); 34 C.F.R. § 104.14(c) (1981); 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(c)(3) (1981).
23. 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(a) (1981); 34 C.F.R. § 104.12(a) (1981). See 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(d) (1981).
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include size of the program, type of operation, and nature and cost of
accommodation. 24
B. State Statutes
Only twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia provide any statutory
relief to the victim of employment discrimination on the basis of mental hand-
icap. 25 Although the language differs somewhat from state to state, the statutes
are essentially similar, providing that an employer shall not base hiring, promo-
tion, or discharge decisions on an employee's or an applicant's mental handicap.
Furthermore, an employer may not discriminate against any mentally handi-
capped person with respect to compensation or any other terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment. Some of the state statutes also restrict the use of preem-
ployment inquiries concerning mental illness. 26
Thirteen of the statutes make some reference, either direct or indirect, to
affirmative action programs. 27 Only four of these statutes require the development
of affirmative action plans,28 and their scope is limited because they apply only to
limited groups of employers. Under the District of Columbia statute, an affirma-
tive action plan "is any plan devised to effectuate remedial or corrective action in
response to past discriminatory practices . . . and may also include those plans
devised to provide preferential treatment for a class or classes of persons, which
preferential treatment by class would otherwise be prohibited."2 9 The District of
24. 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(c) (1981); 34 C.F.R. § 104.12(c) (1981).
25. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-60(a)(1), (2) (West Supp. 1982); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2512 (1981); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 23.167(1)(a) (West Supp. 1982); GA. CODE ANN. § 66-504(a) (Supp. 1981); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 68, § 2-102(A) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-83); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-9-1-2 (Burns 1976 & Supp. 1982);
IOWA CODE § 601A.6(l) (1975); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4572 (1979); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B,§ 16(a), (d) (1979); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 24K (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1976); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 37.1202 (Supp. 1982-83); MINN. STAT. § 363.03(1)(2) (Supp. 1981); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-
303(a) (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1104 (1978); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:8(I)(Supp. 1981); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4.1 (West Supp. 1982-83); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7(A), (C) (1978); N.Y. EXEC. LAw§ 296(1), (1-a) (McKinney 1982); N.C. GEN STAT. § 128-15.3 (1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 4112.02(A), (D) (Page Supp. 1982); OR. REV. STAT. § 659.425(1)(a) (1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43,
§ 955(a) (Purdon Supp. 1965-81); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 28-5-5.3, 28-5-6, 28-5-7(A) (1979 & Supp. 1981);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-50-103(a) (1980); TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §121.003(f) (Vernon 1980); UTAH
CODE ANN. §34-35-6(1)(a), (f) (Supp. 1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495(a)(1) (Supp. 1982); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 49.60.180(1), (2) (Supp. 1982); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-9(a) (Supp. 1982); Wis. STAT. ANN.§ 111.325 (West 1974). Illinois also has a constitutional provision requiring that "persons with a physical
or mental handicap . . .shall be free from discrimination unrelated to ability in the hiring and promotion
practices of any employer." ILL. CONST. art. I, § 19.
26. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4572(D) (1979); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 37.1206(2)(a) (Supp.
1982-83); MINN. STAT. § 363.03(4)(a) (Supp. 1981); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-305(c) (1981); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 28-1-7(D) (1978); N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 296(1)(d) (McKinney 1982); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 4112.02(E) (Page Supp. 1982); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955(b)(1) (Purdon Supp. 1965-81); R.I. GEN.
LAWS §28-5-7(D) (1979 & Supp. 1981); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-35-6(1)(d) (Supp. 1981); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 49.60.180(4) (Supp. 1982).
27. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2524(a) (1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 66-504(a) (Supp. 1981); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 68, § 2-105 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-83); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-9-3 (Burns Supp. 1982); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 49B, § 16(h) (1979); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.1208 (Supp. 1982-83); MINN. STAT.§ 363.073(1) (Supp. 1981); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-403 (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1113 (1978); OR.
REV. STAT. § 659.100 (1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955(b) (Purdon Supp. 1965-81); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 28-5-22 (1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-35-6(2)(e) (Supp. 1981).
28. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2524(b) (1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, § 2-105 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-
83); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-9-3-2 (Burns Supp. 1982); MINN. STAT. § 363.073(1) (Supp. 1981).
29. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2524(a) (1981).
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Columbia statute requires all banks and savings and loan associations to imple-
ment such a plan, which is subject to approval by the District of Columbia Office
of Human Rights. 30 Similar plans by other employers are voluntary but are
enforceable if approved by the Office of Human Rights. 3' Illinois has a more
demanding affirmative action statute than the District of Columbia, but its cov-
erage does not extend to private employers.3 2  Under the Illinois statute, every
state agency must establish a continuing affirmative action plan "designed to
promote equal opportunity in every aspect of agency personnel policy and prac-
tice."'3 3 The agency must submit reports to the Department of Human Rights
indicating: the number, percentage, and average salary of handicapped individ-
uals employed by the agency; the positions in which the percentage of handi-
capped people employed is less than four-fifths of the percentage of handicapped
people in the state work force as a whole; and a description of the methods and
goals the agency has planned for increasing the percentage of handicapped indi-
viduals employed by the agency.3 4 If an agency has 1000 or more employees, it
must also appoint a full-time equal employment opportunity officer to plan affirm-
ative action programs, work on recruitment programs for the agency, inform
aggrieved individuals concerning their statutory rights, and give general employ-
ment advice to the agency. 35
Another approach to affirmative action programs is taken by Oregon 36 and
Michigan.3 7 Their statutes encourage public and private employers to use volun-
tary, preferential hiring systems and quota plans through language assuring that
such plans are legal. The Michigan statute qualifies the use of such a plan by
requiring that the state administrative agency concerned with equal employment
opportunities be given an opportunity to disapprove the plan. 38
In contrast to Michigan's and Oregon's encouragement of affirmative action
plans, other states implicitly discourage the use of affirmative action plans.39 The
statutes in these states note that they do not require an employer to grant preferen-
30. Id § 1-2524(b).
31. Id § 1-2524(a).
32. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, § 2-105 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-83).
33. 1d § 2-105(B)(3).
34. Id.
35. Id. § 2-105(B)(4). Although not as detailed in its requirements as the Illinois statute, Indiana
similarly requires all state agencies to formulate affirmative action plans to end the "underutilization" of
handicapped persons. IND. CODE ANN. § 22-9-3-2 (Burns Supp. 1982). "Underutilization" is defined as
"having fewer members of an affected class in a particular job category and classification than would be
reasonably expected by their availability in the labor market for that job category and classification." Id
§ 22-9-3-1(5). The term "handicapped persons" is defined for this section as "all persons who by reason of
physical or mental defect are unable to achieve full vocational participation."Id § 22-9-3-1(4). Minnesota
requires that all contractors with state contracts valued at more than $50,000, and who employ 20 or more
individuals, have affirmative action plans approved by the state commissioner of human rights. MINN.
STAT. § 363.073(1) (Supp. 1981).
36. OR. REV. STAT. § 659.100 (1981).
37. Micti. COMP. LAws ANN. § 37.1208 (Supp. 1982-83).
38. Id
39. GA. CODE ANN. § 66-504(a) (Supp. 1981); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 16(h) (1979); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 49-2-403 (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1113 (1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-22 (1979); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 34-35-6(2)(e) (Supp. 1981).
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tial treatment to a group or to an individual because of a mental handicap.40
Pennsylvania makes an exception from its general antidiscrimination statute
allowing organizations dealing with the handicapped or disabled to give preferen-
tial treatment in employment to handicapped persons.4 ' Other employers, how-
ever, are discouraged from instituting preferential treatment programs since the
act states: "Nothing in this act shall be construed to require any employer to hire
any person with a job-related handicap or disability. '42
III
DEFINITIONS
The federal and state statutes are general antidiscrimination statutes, which
are effectively limited by narrowly defined terms within the statutes.
A. Statutory Definition of Mental Handicap
1. Federal Definitions. The definition of handicapped for the purpose of sections
503 and 504 provides:
the term 'handicapped individual' means ... any person who (i) has a physical or mental
impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii)
has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment.
4 3
Under section 504, the term physical and mental impairment includes "any
mental or psychological disorder, such as. . .emotional or mental illness. .... ,,44
Major life activities for section 504 purposes are defined as "functions such as
caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
breathing, learning, and working."'4 5 Regulations under section 503 differ, giving
primary attention to those life activities affecting employability. 46
A person is not handicapped for purposes of either section unless the severity of
the impairment is such that "it results in a substantial limitation of one or more
major life activities."'4 7 While "substantially limits" has not been defined for pur-
poses of section 504, it has been defined under section 503. That definition focuses
on employability, stating that, "a handicapped individual is 'substantially limited'
if he or she is likely to experience difficulty in securing, retaining or advancing in
employment because of a handicap.' 48 In EE Black, Ltd v. Marshall,49 a district
court adopted a case by case approach to deciding what is "substantially limiting"
40. Montana's language is slightly different: a handicap is not seen as a reason for "discrimination"
"unless the nature of the service requires the discrimination for the legally demonstrable purpose of cor-
recting a previous discriminatory practice." MoNT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-403 (1981).
41. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955(b) (Purdon Supp. 1965-81).
42. Id. § 962(d).
43. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
44. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i)(B) (1981); 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(j)(2)(i)(B) (1981). Regulations under section
503 do not define impairment. However, in discussing the definition of "handicapped," they recognize
that the "mentally restored" are included. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741 app. A (1981).
45. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1981); 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(j)(2)(ii) (1981).
46. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741 app. A (1981).
47. 45 C.F.R. § 84 app. A (1981); 34 C.F.R. § 104 app. A (1981) (emphasis added).
48. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.2 (1981).
49. 497 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Hawaii 1980).
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under section 503. This approach includes the consideration of several factors: the
number and types of jobs from which the impaired individual would be disquali-
fied if the employer's criteria were used generally, 50 the geographical area to which
the individual has reasonable access, 51 and the individual's own job expectations
and training.52 "If an individual were disqualified from the same or similar jobs
offered by employers throughout the area to which he had reasonable access, then
his impairment or perceived impairment would have to be considered as resulting
in a substantial handicap to employment. '53
The federal definition of handicapped persons includes those who have a
record of an impairment as well as those who currently have a handicap. A person
who "has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental . . . impair-
ment" 54 is, therefore, protected by the statute, as is one with a history of mental or
emotional illness who no longer has the condition. These individuals are included
in the definition because "the attitude of employers, supervisors, and coworkers
toward that previous impairment may result in an individual experiencing diffi-
culty in securing, retaining, or advancing in employment. '55
The definition of handicapped also includes those persons who are "regarded
as having such an impairment. '56 This section has been defined as including a
person:
(A) [having] a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit major life
activities but . . . is treated by a recipient as constituting such a limitation; (B) [having] a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life activities only as a result
of the attitudes of others toward such impairment; or (C) [having] none of the impairments
defined [by this section] but is treated by a recipient as having such an impairment. 5 7
This part of the definition might include those who never had a mental impair-
ment but are nevertheless treated by an employer as having a handicap.58
2. State Defmttz'ons. Twenty-four states which prohibit employment discrimina-
tion against the mentally handicapped and the District of Columbia define, with
varying degrees of specificity, what it means to be mentally handicapped. 59 No
50. Id. at 1100.
51. Id at 1101.
52. Id.
53. Id
54. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3()(2)(iii) (1981); 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(j)(2)(iii) (1981).
55. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741 app. A (1981).
56. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B)(iii) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
57. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(iv) (1981); 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(j)(2)(iv) (1981).
58. 45 C.F.R. § 84 app. A (1981); 34 C.F.R. § 104 app. A (1981). See 41 C.F.R. § 60-741 app. A
(1981).
59. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-51(13) (West Supp. 1982); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2502(23) (1981); GA.
CODE ANN. § 66-502(b), (c), (d)(1), (d)(2), (e), (f) (Supp. 1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, § 1-103(I) (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1982-83); IND. CODE ANN. § 2 2 -9-1- 3 (q) (Burns Supp. 1982); IOWA CODE § 601A.2(11) (1975);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4553(7-A) (1979); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 15(g) (1979); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 37.1103(d) (Supp. 1982-83); MINN. STAT. § 363.01(25) (Supp. 1981); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 49-2-101(13) (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1102(8) (1978); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:3(13) (Supp.
1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(q) (West Supp. 1982-83); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-3(K) (1978); N.Y.
EXEC. LAW § 292(21) (McKinney 1982); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.01(13) (Page 1980); OR. REV.
STAT. § 659.400(2), (3)(a), (3)(b), (3)(c)(A)-(C) (1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 9 54 (p) (Purdon Supp.
1965-81); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-6(H)(i)-(iv) (Supp. 1981); TEx. HUM. REs. CODE ANN. §121.002(4)
(Vernon 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. §34-35-2(14) (Supp. 1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495(d)(5)(A)-(C),
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reported cases interpret state legislative attempts to devise a workable definition of
mental handicap. Nevertheless, some basic generalizations are possible concerning
the range of people the state statutes seek to cover, and the difficulties courts will
eventually encounter in deciding whether a particular individual is protected from
discrimination.
To create a manageable analytical framework, the various state definitions of
mental handicap have been divided into three major categories. The categories
are based on the specificity of the definitions, the first category being the least
specific and the third category the most specific. There are some significant differ-
ences between definitions which are included in a particular category. The simi-
larities between definitions in a given grouping outweigh the differences, however,
providing useful comparisons between the three categories.
The first category of definitions, which includes thirteen states and the District
of Columbia,60 is characterized by the use of vague, general words which do little
to clarify the breadth of a given statute. For example, the Montana statute pro-
vides that "Mental handicap means any mental disability resulting in subaverage
intellectual functioning or impaired social competence."'6 1 It is difficult to deter-
mine how subaverage or how socially impaired one must be before the disability
rises to the level of a "mental handicap." This problem is graphically illustrated
by looking at the Montana statute in conjunction with the Connecticut statute.
Connecticut's general antidiscrimination statute proscribes discrimination against
anyone who is mentally handicapped, 62 but the statute's section of definitions
only discusses mental retardation. "Mental retardation means a significantly sub-
average intellectual function existing with deficits in adaptive behavior and mani-
fested during the development period."'63 The similarity between the Connecticut
definition of "mental retardation" and the Montana definition of mental handicap
could lead to the conclusion that in Montana only drastically impaired persons,
i.e., those who are mentally retarded, are afforded protection. This would be an
anomalous result, since the majority of mentally retarded persons are incapable of
performing most types of gainful employment, and the statute would leave unpro-
tected those persons with lesser handicaps able to perform numerous types of jobs,
but who may be denied employment on the basis of an irrational stigma associated
with even minor mental handicaps.64
(6), (7)(A)-(C), (8), (9), (10), (11)(A)-(C) (Supp. 1982); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-3(t) (Supp. 1982); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 111.32(8)(a) (West Supp. 1982-83).
60. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-51(13) (West Supp. 1982); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2502 (23) (1981); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 68, § 1-103(I) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-83); IND. CODE ANN. § 22- 9 -1-3 (q) (Burns Supp.
1982); IOWA CODE § 601A.2(11) (1975); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.1103(d) (Supp. 1982-83); MINN.
STAT. § 363.01(25) (Supp. 1981); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-101(13) (1981); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-
A:3(13) (Supp. 1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-3(K) (1978); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 95 4 (p) (Purdon
Supp. 1965-81); UTAH CODE ANN. §34-35-2(14) (Supp. 1981); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-3(t) (Supp. 1982); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 111.32(8)(a) (West Supp. 1982-83).
61. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-101(13) (1981).
62. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-51(13) (West Supp. 1982).
63. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-60(1), (2) (West Supp. 1982).
64. Set Wald, The Legal Rights of People with Mental Disabilities in the Community: A Plea for Laissez Faire,
in 2 LExAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED 1033 (1973).
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The statutes of Utah65 and West Virginia 66 define a handicap as any physical
or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more "major life activi-
ties." Unfortunately, neither statute defines major life activity. The statutes con-
template that an individual may be unable to perform one or more major life
activities, but may still be able to perform adequately as an employee. To clarify
the problem that this type of definition presents, consider a hypothetical involving
a job-seeker who has a history of mental illness: a schizophrenic whose disease is
currently under control through the use of drugs. This schizophrenic would not be
able to claim a current impairment of a major life activity because he would be
presently functioning as a normal person. An employer may decide, however, that
he does not want a schizophrenic, who could have a relapse at any time, poten-
tially "polluting" the business environment. This type of situation, theoretically,
would not be covered by either the Utah or West Virginia statutes.
Looking at these two statutes in a more practical light, a court in either state
would be unlikely to allow employment discrimination against the above-men-
tioned schizophrenic. The court might cite the unlikelihood of such a legislative
intent. Nevertheless, the above analysis suggests the need to word these statutes
carefully to safeguard against uneven application and unnecessary litigation.
The Pennsylvania statute67 is typically 68 general in its description of persons
covered, but is unusual because it provides that the increased cost of insurance to
an employer cannot be a basis for refusing employment to an otherwise qualified
handicapped individual.69 Thus, the Pennsylvania legislature is mandating that
employers make a specific accommodation. In contrast, the District of Columbia
definition states that, " 'Physical handicap' means a bodily or mental disablement
which may be the result of injury, illness or congenital condition for which reason-
able accommodation can be made." 70 A District of Columbia court could rule
that increased cost of insurance is not a "reasonable accommodation" that an
employer must make. Such a decision would remove protection for a large sector
of the mentally handicapped population because the presence of a mentally handi-
capped individual in the workplace would probably raise the cost of insurance. 7'
A second category of definitions, which includes seven states,72 is characterized
by a moderate amount of specificity and extensive lists of conditions which may
65. UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-35-2(14) (Supp. 1981).
66. W. VA. CODE § 5-11-3(t) (Supp. 1982).
67. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 § 954(p) (Purdon Supp. 1965-81).
68. See supra note 60.
69. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 § 954(p) (Purdon Supp. 1965-81).
70. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2502(23) (1981).
71. Not only may a company employing mentally handicapped individuals have to pay more for
general liability insurance, but such a company may be placed in an "assigned risk pool" for purposes of
setting its workmen's compensation premium. Generally, insurance companies underwriting the "assigned
risk pool" charge an 8% premium to insure these high-risk companies. Interview with H. Lynn Crayton,
The Insurance Center of Durham (Nov. 1, 1982).
72. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4553(7-A) (1979); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 15(g) (1979); NEB.
REV. STAT. §48-1102(8) (1978); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(q) (West Supp. 1982-83); N.Y. ExEc. LAw
§ 292(21) (McKinney 1982); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4112.01(13) (Page 1980); TEx. HUM. RES. CODE
ANN. § 121.002(4) (Vernon 1980).
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cause difficulties for a mentally handicapped individual in the employment
market. The Nebraska statute is a typical example.
Disability shall mean any physical or mental condition, infirmity, malformation, or dis-
figurement which is caused by bodily injury, birth defect, or illness, including epilepsy or
seizure disorders, and which shall include, but not be limited to, any degree of paralysis,
amputation, lack of physical coordination, blindness or visual impediment, deafness or
hearing impediment, muteness or speech impediment, or physical reliance on a dog guide,
wheelchair, or other remedial appliance or device and shall also mean the physical or
mental condition of a person which constitutes a substantial handicap, as determined by a
physician, but is unrelated to such person's ability to engage in a particular occupation.
73
Nebraska's statute takes great pains to protect specific groups of mentally and
physically handicapped people. In addition, the statute closes what might have
been a loophole for employers by saying that the definition of disability "shall
include, but not be limited to . . ." the physical or mental conditions listed.
A notable omission from the Nebraska statute, one which finds expression only
in the Maryland 74 and Texas 75 statutes, is the failure to mention the mentally
retarded in the group of people who possess a physical or mental impairment.
Perhaps the legislatures of Nebraska and the other four states in this category
which do not mention the mentally retarded felt that this class of persons would
not be able to function normally in a job. Nevertheless, the language "including
but not limited to" indicates that a mentally retarded person would not be pre-
cluded from showing unlawful discrimination under such statutes. The statutes'
failure to mention mental retardation, however would allow an employer to con-
tend that the legislature felt that a person classified as mentally retarded could not
have a handicap that is "unrelated to such person's ability to engage in a partic-
ular occupation .... ,,76
Ohio's statute is somewhat different from the other six statutes in the second
category because it does not specifically mention mental handicap. It provides:
"Handicap" means a medically diagnosable, abnormal condition which is expected to con-
tinue for a considerable length of time, whether correctable or uncorrectable by good med-
ical practice, which can reasonably be expected to limit the person's functional ability,
including, but not limited to, seeing, hearing, thinking, ambulating, climbing, descending,
lifting, grasping, sitting, rising, any related function, or any limitation due to weakness and
significantly decreased endurance, so that he cannot perform his everyday routine living
and working without significantly increased hardship and vulnerability to what are consid-
ered the everyday obstacles and hazards encountered by the nonhandicapped.
7 7
The Ohio statute is comprehensive, and is unusual in its focus and care in
delineating thq functions that a mentally handicapped person would have diffi-
culty performing, but which might not bear on his ultimate ability to perform a
particular task. The statute proscribes discrimination even if the handicap will
result in "significantly, increased hardship" to the individual. In this situation an
employer may want to argue that the contortions of the mentally handicapped
73. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1102(8) (1978).
74. MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 15 (g) (1979).
75. TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 121.002(4) (Vernon 1980).
76. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1102(8) (1978).
77. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.01(13) (Page 1980).
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individual have an adverse psychological effect on the handicapped person's co-
workers.
The Ohio statute also states that an employer cannot discriminate against a
handicapped individual even though the handicap may result in "significantly
increased. . . vulnerability to. . .everyday obstacles and hazards. T7  This provi-
sion could have extraordinary ramifications because it suggests that even though a
working environment may pose a substantial danger to a mentally handicapped
individual, such an individual may voluntarily assume the risk despite an
employer's objections. 79
The final category of definitions includes only four states,8 0 and represents
some of the more recent state attempts to grapple with the question of who is
mentally handicapped. These last four states have been greatly influenced by the
federal attempt to define mental illness.
The Rhode Island definition of mental handicap, although more detailed than
the federal definition, has many provisions which are identical.
(H) The term "handicap" means any physical or mental impairment which substan-
tially limits one or more major life activities, a record of such an impairment or is regarded
as having such an impairment by any person, employer, labor organization or employment
agency ....
(i) "Physical or mental impairment" means any physiological disorder or condition,
cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following bodily
systems: neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, including speech
organs; cardiovascular; reproductive, digestive; genito-urinary; hemo and lymphatic; skin;
and endocrine; or any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic
brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.
(ii) "Major life activities" means functions such as caring for one's self, performing
manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.
(iii) "Has a record of such impairment" means any history of, or has been misclassified
as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities.
(iv) "Regarded as having an impairment" means has a physical or mental impairment
that does not substantially limit major life activities but that is treated as constituting such
a limitation; has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life activi-
ties only as a result of attitudes of others toward such impairment; or has none of the
impairments but is treated as having such an impairment.
8
'
As the Rhode Island statute illustrates, this third category of definitions attempts
to provide broad protection to mentally handicapped individuals who act ually
suffer from some sort of serious impairment, but who still can adequately perform
a job. Perhaps more significantly, the definition provides protection for the indi-
vidual who is perceived as having an impairment but who does not actually have
78. Id.
79. Rose v. Hanna Mining Co., 94 Wash. 2d 307, 616 P.2d 1229 (1980), reached a conclusion which
also may be expected under the Ohio statute, supra note 77. In Hanna, an epileptic job applicant was not
hired even though he could perform eleven of twelve jobs at a smelter which contained molten ore at
thousands of degrees Fahrenheit. The Washington Supreme Court reversed the lower court's grant of
summary judgment for the employer because there was a legitimate question whether a majority of people
with the plaintiff's condition were incapable of performing the job.
80. GA. CODE ANN. § 66-502(b), (c), (d)(1), (d)(2), (e), (0 (Supp. 1981); OR. REV. STAT. § 659.400(2),
(3)(a), (3)(b), (3)(c)(A)-(C) (1981); R.I. GEN. LAws § 28-5-6(H)(i)-(iv) (Supp. 1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 495d(5)(A)-(C), (6), (7)(A)-(C), (8), (9), (10), (1 1)(A)-(C) (Supp. 1982).
81. R.I. GEN. LAws § 28-5-6(H)(i)-(iv) (Supp. 1981).
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one. The Rhode Island statute avoids some of the problems present in the broad,
sweeping language of the first category of definitions.8 2 The schizophrenic dis-
cussed in the hypothetical situation above would be protected in Rhode Island,
because protection is specifically accorded not only to those with drastic impair-
ments, but also to those in a middle range who have an impairment which does
not rise to the level of limiting a major life activity, or individuals who have no
impairment but are perceived as having one.
If Rhode Island limited its definition of mental handicap to the one sentence
description in section (H), the statute would be almost indistinguishable from defi-
nitions in the first category. It is the further qualification of the sweeping language
of section (H) in subsections (i) - (iv) that breathes life into the statute, and demon-
strates a deeper concern with the problems that face the mentally handicapped in
the job market. In essence, subsections (i) - (iv) recognize that words like "impair-
ment" or "major life activities" are not susceptible to easy definition, and that
leaving the interpretation of these words to employers, and ultimately to the
courts, results in a disservice to the people whom antidiscrimination statutes are
designed to protect.
The definition of physical or mental impairment in the Rhode Island statute8 3
is broad enough so that an employer would find it difficult to think of a class of
mentally handicapped persons not covered by the definition, yet at the same time
specific enough to provide the courts with a meaningful standard to adjudicate a
discrimination claim. Many of the statutes from all three categories define a
mental handicap as impairing one or more "major life activities, '8 4 but only the
third category carefully lists these major life activities to inform employers of what
they may and may not do. Under the Rhode Island, 5 Georgia, 6 and federal8 7
statutes, a person may be limited in his ability to care for himself, perform manual
tasks, see, hear, speak, breathe, learn, or even work, but if he can successfully per-
form the occupation, an employer may not refuse to hire the handicapped indi-
vidual. The careful drafting of the statutes in the third category, although still in
need of refinement, should eliminate much time-consuming litigation on the issue
of who is protected from discrimination on the basis of a handicap. The words
most likely to create serious problems are "substantially limits." When does the
handicap substantially limit, and when does it completely limit, or preclude, effec-
tive functioning in the workplace? These are questions of statutory interpretation
which will eventually be adjudicated on an ad hoc basis.
B. "Otherwise Qualified" and Bona Fide Occupational Qualification
Exceptions
1. Federal Statutes. Section 504 prohibits discrimination against an "otherwise
82. See supra text accompanying notes 60-71.
83. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-6(H)(i) (Supp. 1981).
84. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-35-2(14) (Supp. 1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495d(5)(A)-(C)
(Supp. 1982).
85. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-6(H)(ii) (Supp. 1981).
86. GA. CODE ANN. § 66-502() (Supp. 1981).
87. 29 U.S.C. 706(7)(B) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
[Vol. 45: No. 3
FROM WANDERERS TO WORKERS
qualified handicapped individual.""" The term "otherwise qualified" was defined
by the United States Supreme Court in Southeastern Community College v. Davis .89 In
Davis, an individual with a hearing problem wanted to attend nursing school at
Southeastern Community College. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
defined "otherwise qualified" as one who could meet the qualifications in every
respect except for his or her handicap.90 Under this definition, however, "a blind
person possessing all of the qualifications for driving a bus except sight could be
said to be 'otherwise' qualified for the job of driving." 9 1 The Supreme Court
rejected the Fourth Circuit's view, holding that "[a]n otherwise qualified person is
one who is able to meet all of a program's requirements in spite of his handicap.
9 2
The Court said that section 504 does not require a recipient of federal funds to
"disregard the disabilities of handicapped individuals . . . [but says] only that
mere possession of a handicap is not a permissible ground for assuming an inability
to function in a particular context."'93
The regulations promulgated pursuant to section 504 define an "otherwise
qualified handicapped person" in less restrictive terms than did the Supreme
Court. Such a person, with respect to employment, is one "who, with reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the job in question. 94
Only the performance of essential functions rather than all functions is required
because "handicapped persons should not be disqualified simply because they may
have difficulty in performing tasks that bear only a marginal relationship to a
particular job."'95 The definition of "otherwise qualified" under section 503 is sim-
ilar to that under section 504.96
2. State Statutes. Every state statute allows an employer to discharge or to refuse
to hire a mentally handicapped individual who is unable to perform a job ade-
quately. 97 The statutes do so either in their initial definition of mental handicap
for the purposes of the employment discrimination statute or in their definition of
88. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
89. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
90. Id at 406.
91. 45 C.F.R. § 84 app. A (1981); 34 C.F.R. § 104 app. A (1981).
92. 442 U.S. at 406.
93. Id. at 405.
94. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(1) (1981); 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(k)(1) (1981).
95. 45 C.F.R. § 84 app. A. (1981); 34 C.F.R. § 104 app. A (1981).
96. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.2 (1981).
97. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-60(a)(1), (2) (West Supp. 1982); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2502(23) (1981);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 23.167(8)(a) (West Supp. 1982); GA. CODE ANN. § 66-504(a) (Supp. 1981); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 68, § 1-103(I)(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-83); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-9-1-3(q) (Burns Supp.
1982); IOWA CODE § 601A.2(11) (1975); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4572, 4573(4) (1979); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 49B, § 16(a)(1), (g) (1979); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 149, § 24K (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1976); MICH.
COMP. LAws ANN. § 37.1202(1) (Supp. 1982-83); MINN. STAT. § 363.02(5) (Supp. 1981); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 49-2-303(1)(a) (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1102(8), 1108(1) (1978); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-
A:3(13), 8(I) (Supp. 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4.1 (West Supp. 1982-83); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7(D)
(1978); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(21) (McKinney 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 128-15.3 (1981); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 4112.02(L) (Page Supp. 1982); OR. REV. STAT. § 659.425 (1)(a) (1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
43 § 955 (Purdon Supp. 1965-81); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-7(D) (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-50-103(a)
(1980); TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 121.003() (Vernon 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-35-6(2)(a) (Supp.
1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495(a)(1) (Supp. 1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.180(1) (Supp.
1982); W.VA. CODE § 5-11-9(a) (Supp. 1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 11 1.34(2)(a) (West Supp. 1982-83).
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unfair employment practice. Generally, one of three types of wording is used. 98
First, some statutes state that the particular mental handicap must have no rele-
vance to the specific job in question.99 Second, some statutes provide that the
mental handicap cannot impede performance of the job.'°0 Finally, some statutes
allow an exemption when a specific mental ability is a bona fide occupational
qualification for the job.' 0 '
Only four states and the District of Columbia have progressed beyond these
general definitions of job relatedness to provide additional statutory guidance as to
the respective rights and obligations of the mentally ill individual and his
employer. 10 2 The District of Columbia 0 3 and Oregon 0 4 favor the employee by
requiring that the employer make reasonable accommodation for the mentally
handicapped employee. Rhode Island' 0 5 and Ohio 10 6 provide some protection for
the mentally handicapped individual by requiring that an employer who inquires
about a mental handicap during the hiring process do so only if the appropriate
state commission on human rights has certified the absence of such handicap as a
bona fide occupational qualification. Thus, an independent third party makes the
initial determination as to job relatedness. In contrast, Indiana'0 7  gives the
employer control over the definition of reasonable job performance by specifying
not only that the individual must be able to perform the job safely and efficiently,
but that the performance must be according to "the standards set by the
employer." 10
98. Maine, Maryland, and Nebraska each combine two of these types of wording in their statutory
provisions. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 4572, 4573(4) (1979) (bona fide occupational qualification and
impairment of performance); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 16(a)(1), (g) (1979) (impairment of performance
and bona fide occupational qualification); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-1102(8), 1108(1) (1978) (relevance to job
and bona fide occupational qualification).
99. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, § 1-103(I)(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-83); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-9-1-3(q)
(Burns Supp. 1982); IOWA CODE § 601A.2(11) (1975); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.1202(1) (Supp. 1982-
83); NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-1102(8) (1978); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:3(13) (Supp. 1981); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 28-1-7(D) (1978).
100. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2502(23) (1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 66-503(b)(1), 504(a) (Supp. 1981); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4573(4) (1979); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 16(a)(l) (1979); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 149, § 24K (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1976); MINN. STAT. § 363.02(5) (Supp. 1981); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 49-2-303(1)(a) (1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4.1 (West Supp. 1982-83); N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 292(21)
(McKinney 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 128-15.3 (1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(L) (Page Supp.
1982); OR. REV. STAT. § 659.425(1)(a) (1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-50-103(a) (1980); TEX. HUM. RES.
CODE ANN. § 121.003() (Vernon 1980); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.180(1) (Supp. 1982); W.VA.
CODE § 5-11-9(a) (Supp. 1982); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 111.34(2)(a) (West Supp. 1982-83).
101. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-60(a)(1), (2) (West Supp. 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 23.167(8)(a) (West
Supp. 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4572 (1979); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 16(g) (1979); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 48-1108(1) (1978); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:8(I) (Supp. 1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43,
§ 955 (Purdon Supp. 1965-81); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-7(D) (1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-35-6(2)(a)
(Supp. 1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495(a)(1) (Supp. 1982).
102. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2502(23) (1981); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-9-1-13(a) (Bums Supp. 1982); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(E) (Page Supp. 1982); OR. REV. STAT. 659.425(I)(a) (1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 28-5-7(D) (1979).
103. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2502(23) (1981).
104. OR. REV. STAT. § 659.425(1)(a) (1981).
105. R.I. GEN. LAWs § 28-5-7(D) (1979).
106. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(E) (Page Supp. 1981).
107. IND. CODE ANN. § 22-9-1-13(a) (Bums Supp. 1982).
108. Id
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C. Coverage of Employers and Employees
1. Federal Statutes. Section 504 prohibits discrimination against handicapped
persons "under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance."10 9
This phrase, however, has not been interpreted to mean any federal assistance but
rather only those programs whose purpose is to provide employment.1 0 In United
States v. Cabrini Medical Center,' an employee who took Valium to quiet his nerves
lost his temper at work and beat a faucet with a cane until the faucet broke. The
employee was discharged and filed a complaint with the Department of Health
and Human Services' Office for Civil Rights claiming he was discharged because
of his mental disability. The hospital refused to allow the department to investi-
gate and the government brought an action to force compliance. The district
court concluded that "section 504 was designed to eliminate discrimination under
any program or activity receiving federal assistance 'without regard to the purpose
for which the funds were received.' "112 The hospital received federal assistance in
the form of Medicare and Medicaid. The court of appeals, however, held that
Medicare and Medicaid were not sufficient to bring the hospital within section 504
because the objective of those payments was not to provide employment. 1 3 The
court based its decision on section 505(a)(2) which provides that the remedies for
section 504 are the same as those under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."14
Title VI is limited to aid having a "primary objective" of providing employ-
ment.11 5 Therefore, there is no judicial remedy unless providing employment is a
primary objective of the aid.
The phrase "any federal financial assistance" has been further qualified to
mean that even if the purpose of the aid is to provide employment, the individual
must be an intended beneficiary of the assistance. In Simpson v. Reynolds Metals
Co. 116 Reynolds received federal assistance in the form of on-the-job training
which allows veterans to receive money from the government while they partici-
pate. Simpson, who was not part of this program, claimed he had been dismissed
because of his alcoholism. The court decided "[t]he statute does not . . . generally
forbid discrimination against the handicapped by recipients of federal assist-
ance. . . .To be actionable, the discrimination must come in the operation of the
program or manifest itself in a handicapped individual's exclusion from the pro-
gram or a diminution of the benefits he would otherwise receive from the pro-
gram.""17  Considering the same question in Simon v. St. Lout's City Police
109. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). For a definition of federal financial assistance, see 45
C.F.R. § 84.3(h) (1981).
110. See Carmi v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 620 F.2d 672 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denzid, 449
U.S. 892 (1980); Trageser v. Libbie Rehabilitation Center, Inc., 590 F.2d 87 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442
U.S. 947 (1978).
111. 639 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1981).
112. Id at 910.
113. Id at 909.
114. 29 U.S.C. § 794a (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
115. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-3 (1976).
116. 629 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1980).
117. Id at 1232.
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Department , 118 a district court in Missouri stated that the "plaintiff must allege that
the particular job category in which he was allegedly discriminated was a program
or activity receiving federal financial assistance."' 19 In Simon, the plaintiff was
denied employment as a commissioned police officer. He did not, however, allege
that he was denied all employment by the department or that the particular job
which he was denied received federal assistance.120
The term "federal financial assistance" has also been held not to include gov-
ernment agencies. 12 1 Discrimination in employment by the Federal Government
is actionable under section 501 rather than section 504. 122 Because of these restric-
tions, the courts have protected fewer mentally ill employees than the statute
appears to reach. Only non-Federal government employees, participating in a
program funded by the Federal Government for the purpose of providing employ-
ment, are protected under section 504.
Section 503 requires federal contractors with contracts in excess of $2,500 to
take affirmative action to employ qualified handicapped individuals.1 2 3 Whether
this section protects employees working for a contractor on a job other than the
federally contracted job is unclear.
2. State Statutes. Definitions of the types of employers and employees covered by
mental handicap employment discrimination statutes vary from state to state.12 4
Some statutes provide an extremely broad definition, extending coverage to any
employer conducting business in the state, 125 or to all public and private
employers. 126 Other statutes specify that they apply to all state agencies, 12 7 or
limit the extent of coverage of private employers to those employing a certain
118. 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases (BNA) 1363 (E.D. Mo. 1977).
119. Id at 1364.
120. Id.
121. Coleman v. Darden, 595 F.2d 533 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 927 (1979).
122. Id at 538. See also 29 U.S.C. § 791 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
123. See supra note 16.
124. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-60 (West Supp. 1982); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2502(10) (1981); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 23.167(1) (West Supp. 1982); GA. CODE ANN. § 66-502(g) (Supp. 1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
68, § 2-101(B)(b), (c), (d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-83); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-9-1-3(h) (Burns Supp. 1982);
IOWA CODE § 601A.2(5) (1975); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4553(4) (1979); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B,
§ 15(b) (1979); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 24K (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1976); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 37.1201(b) (Supp. 1982-83); MINN. STAT. § 363.01(15) (Supp. 1981); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-101(7),
(8) (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1102(2) (1978); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:4(5) (1966); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 10:5-5(e), () (West Supp. 1982-83); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-2(B) (1978); N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 292(5),
(6) (McKinney 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 128-15.3 (1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.01(2), (3) (Page
1980); OR. REV. STAT. § 659.400(1) (1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 954(b) (Purdon Supp. 1965-81); R.I.
GEN. LAWS 28-5-6(B) (Supp. 1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-50-103(a) (1980); TEx. HUM. RES. CODE ANN.
§ 121.003() (Vernon 1980); UTAH CODE* ANN. § 34-35-2(5) (Supp. 1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 495d(1) (Supp. 1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.180 (Supp. 1982); W.VA. CODE § 5-11-3(d)
(Supp. 1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.32(5), (6) (West Supp. 1982-83).
125. CONN. GEN. STAT. 46a-60(a)(1) (West Supp. 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 23.167(1) (West Supp.
1982); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 149, § 24K (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1976); TEX. HUM. REs. CODE ANN.
§ 121.003() (Vernon 1980); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495d(1) (1978); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.180
(Supp. 1982).
126. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(e) (West Supp. 1982-83); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-50-103(a) (1980).
127. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-70 (West Supp. 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 128-15.3 (1981); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 8-50-103(a) (1980); Wis. STAT. § 111.32(3) (Supp. 1982-83).
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number of people. 28 Charitable, religious, and fraternal nonprofit organizations
are frequently excluded from coverage.' 29
Coverage of employees is more consistently defined from state to state than is
coverage of employers. As opposed to an employer, an employee is defined by
specifying which employees are excluded from coverage rather than which
employees are covered by the statute. 3 0 The exemptions usually include two cate-
gories: those employed by a close relative, such as a parent or a child,13' and any
person employed in domestic service.1 32
IV
ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES
Statutes provide two procedural routes through which a mentally handicapped
128. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 23.162(6) (West Supp. 1982) (15 or more employees for each working day in
each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year); GA. CODE ANN. § 66-502(g)
(Supp. 1981) (15 or more employees); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-9-3(h) (Burns Supp. 1982) (six or more
employees); IOWA CODE § 601A.6(5)(a) (Supp. 1982-83) (four or more employees); MD. ANN. CODE art.
49B, § 15(b) (1979) (15 or more employees); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 37.1201(b) (Supp. 1982-83) (four
or more employees); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:4(5) (1966) (six or more employees); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 28-1-2(B) (1978) (four or more employees); N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 292(5) (1982) (four or more employees);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.01(2) (Page 1980) (four or more employees); OR. REV. STAT. § 659.400(1)
(1981) (six or more employees); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 954(b) (Purdon Supp. 1965-81) (four or more
employees); R.I. GEN. LAWs § 28-5-6(B) (Supp. 1981) (four or more employees); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-
35-2(5) (Supp. 1981) (25 or more employees); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.040 (Supp. 1982) (eight or
more employees); W.VA. CODE § 5-11-3(d) (Supp. 1982) (12 or more employees).
129. IND. CODE ANN. § 22-9-1-3(h) (Burns Supp. 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4553(4) (1979);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 15(b) (1979); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-101(8) (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-
1102(2) (1978); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:4(5) (1966); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-35-2(5) (Supp. 1981);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.040 (Supp. 1982); W. VA. CODE § 5-1 1-3(d) (Supp. 1982); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 111.32(6)(b) (Supp. 1982-83).
130. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, § 2-101(A) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-83); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-9-1-3(i)
(Burns Supp. 1982); IOWA CODE § 601A.2(6), .6 (1975); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4553(3) (1979); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 15(e) (1979); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.1201(a) (Supp. 1982-83); MINN. STAT.
§ 363.02(1) (Supp. 1981); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-1102(6), 1103 (1978); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-
A:4(6) (1966); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(e) (West Supp. 1982-83); N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 292(6) (McKinney
1982); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.01(3) (Page 1980); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 954(c) (Purdon Supp.
1965-81); R.I. GEN. LAws § 28-5-6(C) (Supp. 1981); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-35-2(6) (Supp. 1981); W. VA.
CODE § 5-11-3(3) (Supp. 1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.32(5) (Supp. 1982-83).
131. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2502(10) (1981); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-9-1-3(i) (Burns Supp. 1982); IOWA
CODE § 601A.6(5)(a) (Supp. 1982-83); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4553(3) (1979); MICH. COMP. LAws
ANN. § 37.1202(2) (Supp. 1982-83); MINN. STAT. § 363.02 (Supp. 1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1103
(1978); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:4(6) (1966); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(0 (West Supp. 1982-83);
N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 292(6) (McKinney 1982); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 9 54(c) (Purdon Supp. 1965-81); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 28-5-6(C) (Supp. 1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.040 (Supp. 1982); W. VA. CODE
§ 5-11-3(e) (Supp. 1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.32(5) (Supp. 1982-83).
132. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2502(10) (1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, § 2-101(A)(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1982-83); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-9-1-3(i) (Burns Supp. 1982); IOWA CODE § 601A.6(b), (c) (Supp. 1982-83);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.1201(a) (Supp. 1982-83); MINN. STAT. § 363.02(1) (Supp. 1981); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 48-1103 (1978); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:4(6) (1966); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(0 (West
Supp. 1982-83); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(6) (McKinney 1982); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.01(3) (Page
1980); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 954(b) (Purdon Supp. 1965-81); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-6(C) (Supp. 1981);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-35-2(6) (Supp. 1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.040 (Supp. 1982); W. VA.
CODE § 5-11-3(d) (Supp. 1982). Exemptions are not necessarily limited to these two categories. Illinois, for
example, also excludes individuals employed in agricultural labor, elected public officials, certain staff
members of elected public officials, and the chief administrators of state agencies. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68,
§ 2-101(A)(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-83).
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individual who has experienced employment discrimination may obtain relief.
The first route is by application to an administrative agency statutorily empow-
ered to handle such complaints; the second is by resort to the judicial system.
A. Administrative Remedies
1. Section 503. An administrative remedy is expressly provided in section 503 of
the Federal Rehabilitation Act.' 3 3 A mentally ill person who believes he has been
discriminated against may file a complaint with the OFCCP of the Department of
Labor.' 34 Under OFCCP procedures, a complaint must be filed within 180 days
of the date of the alleged violation. 3 5 The Department of Labor then investigates
the complaint. 36 When a violation is found, the Department tries to settle it
informally and if that is not possible, a formal hearing is held to determine if there
has been a violation of the Act. 137 To gain compliance, the OFCCP may seek
appropriate judicial action to enforce the contractual provision included in federal
contracts requiring affirmative action. 3 The OFCCP may also withhold any
payments due on the contract 39 or terminate it.14°
2. Section 504. The text of section 504 does not provide an administrative
remedy. Section 505, however, provides that the remedies and procedures for sec-
tion 504 are those of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.'4' The regulations
promulgated under section 504 provide the same. 42
Recipients of federal financial assistance from the Department of Health and
Human services are required to submit periodic compliance reports. 4 3 In addi-
tion, a person who believes he has been discriminated against can file a complaint
with the Department of Health and Human Services Office for Civil Rights
(OCR) within 180 days of the date of the alleged discrimination. ' 4 4 When the
report, a complaint, or other information indicates a failure to comply with the
regulations, the Department investigates. 45 If violations are found, OCR tries to
settle the matter informally.' 46 If that is not successful, OCR may suspend or
terminate the benefits after a hearing to determine the existence of a violation' 4 7
or refer the matter to the Justice Department with a recommendation that appro-
priate proceedings be brought. 48
133. 29 U.S.C. § 793(b) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
134. Id
135. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.26(a) (1981).
136. Id § 60-741.26(e).
137. Id §§ 60-741.28(a), 60-741.29.
138. Id § 60-741.28(b).
139. Id § 60-741.28(c).
140. Id § 60-741.28(d).
141. 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
142. 45 C.F.R. § 84.61 (1981); 34 C.F.R. § 104.61 (1981).
143. 45 C.F.R. § 80.6(b).
144. Id § 80.7(b).
145. Id § 80.7(c).
146. Id § 80.7(d).
147. Id § 80.8(c).
148. Id § 80.8(a).
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3. States. Administrative remedies are the most common route for relief under
the state statutes. 49 Administrative agencies, usually having a name such as the
human rights commission or the equal employment opportunity commission, are
generally composed of fewer than ten individuals appointed by the governor,
although they may at times delegate their duties.15 0 The procedure for alleging an
employment discrimination violation is similar to the federal procedure in all of
the states which have such a commission. The following description generalizes
the basic elements of state procedure; however, the details vary in different
jurisdictions.
To gain protection against discrimination an aggrieved individual must file a
sworn written complaint against a specified employer within a certain period of
time after the alleged violation has occurred. After allowing the employer to
respond to the allegations, the commission determines if probable cause of a viola-
tion exists. If the commission finds cause to believe that there has been a violation,
a period of arbitration and conciliation ensues, during which the commission
attempts to negotiate an agreement between employer and employee. If such an
agreement is reached, it is enforceable by court decree in the event of a violation.
If this informal process fails, the commission may order a hearing, at which both
sides have an opportunity to present evidence, cross-examine witnesses and be rep-
resented by counsel. At this stage, the commission staff will often represent the
complainant. Based on this hearing, the commission makes findings of fact and
conclusions of law, and issues a decree either dismissing the complaint or finding a
violation and providing for statutory remedies. Should either party wish to appeal
such a decree he may do so in the lower courts of the state, subject to appellate
judicial review. If not appealed, such an order is subject to enforcement by the
state courts.
B. Judicial Action
The second enforcement route is a civil court action.
149. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-82 (West Supp. 1982); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2544 to 2555 (1981); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 23.167(10) (West Supp. 1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, § 7-102 to 104, 8-103 to 111 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1982-83); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-9-1-6 (Bums Supp. 1982); IOWA CODE § 601A.15, .17 (Supp.
1982-83); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4611-4612 (1979 & Supp. 1981-82); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B,
§§ 4,9-13 (1979); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 24C (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1976); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.
§ 37.1605 (Supp. 1982-83); MINN. STAT. § 363.06, .071, 072 (Supp. 1981); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-501
to -508 (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1118 to -1120 (1978); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:9, :10 (1966 &
Supp. 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-13 to -24 (West Supp. 1982-83); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-10 to -13
(1978); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 297-298 (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1982-83); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.05
to .06 (Page 1980); OR. REV. STAT. § 659.435 (1981); PA. STAT. ANN, tit. 43, § 959-960 (Purdon Supp.
1965-81); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-17 to 28-5-28 (1979 & Supp. 1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-50-103(B)
(1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-35-7 to 34-35-8 (Supp. 1981); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-10 to 5-11-11 (1979);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.39 (West Supp. 1982-83).
150. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-52 (West Supp. 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 23.163 (West Supp. 1982);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, § 8-101 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-83); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-9-1-4 (1976); IOWA
CODE § 601A.3 (Supp. 1982-83); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4561 (1979); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 1
(1979); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-15-1706 (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1116 (1978); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 354-A:4 (1966); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-7 (West 1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-3(A) (1978); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 4112.03 (Page 1980); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 956 (Purdon 1964 & Supp. 1965-81); RI.
GEN. LAWS § 28-5-8 (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-103 (1980); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-5 (Supp. 1982).
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1. Federal System. In the federal system, a plaintiff alleging discrimination on the
basis of a mental handicap must first come within the narrow definitions discussed
above. He must next convince the court that there is a private right of action
under sections 503 and 504. A plaintiff may allege violations of both sections if he
satisfies each section's jurisdictional requirements. 15 1
Most courts considering the question have found a private right of action
under section 504.152 The courts are split, however, over the question of the exist-
ence of a private right of action under section 503.153 The factors set out in Cori v.
Ash 154 are used to determine when a private right of action is implied by a statute.
These factors are:
a. Is the plaintiff one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted?
b. Is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such
a remedy or to deny one?
c. Is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such
a remedy for the plaintiff?
d. Is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically
the concern of the states, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based
solely on federal law?
15 5
a. Is Plaint r One of the Class for Whose Especial Benefit the Statute Was
Enacted? The court in Hart v. County of Alameda 156 unequivocally decided that the
handicapped were the class for whose benefit sections 503 and 504 were enacted. 57
The Fifth Circuit, however, in Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc. ,158 considering an action
under section 503, took the position that it was not clear that the handicapped
were the class for whom the statute was enacted. The court noted that the lan-
guage of section 503 is different from that in sections 504, 601, and 901. Section
503 puts the duty on the government, not on the general public, to prevent dis-
crimination by requiring "contractors to take affirmative steps to employ . . .
handicapped persons."' 15 9
b. Leg'slative Intent. In considering legislative intent, the Hart court noted
that the legislative history of the 1974 amendments which added the definition of
151. See Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 629 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1980); Hart v. County of Alameda,
485 F. Supp. 66 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
152. Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1981); Doe v. Syracuse School Dist., 508 F. Supp.
333 (N.D.N.Y. 1981); Drennon v. Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Halderman
v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977),modiffd, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979).
Lloyd v. Regional Trans. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977), found a private right of action since at that
time there were no administrative procedures. It expressly left open the question of what it would decide
once the administrative procedures were in place. Id at 1286 n.29.
153. See, e.g., Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 629 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1980) (no private right of
action); Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir. 1980) (no private right of action); Clark v.
FELEC Serv., 489 F. Supp. 165 (D. Alaska 1980) (there is a private right of action at least after the
enactment of the 1978 amendments but no decision as to whether there was one from 1973-78); Hart v.
County of Alameda, 485 F. Supp. 66 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (there is a private right of action).
154. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
155. Id at 78.
156. 485 F. Supp. 66 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
157. Id at 68.
158. 611 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir. 1980).
159. Id at 1079.
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handicapped to the statute offered little guidance. 160 That history indicates that
section 504 was patterned after section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
section 901 of the Education Amendments of 1972.161 Furthermore, the history
states, "This approach to implementation of section 504, which closely follows the
models of the above-cited antidiscrimination provisions, would. . . permit a judi-
cial remedy through a private action." 162 The Hart court also noted that a private
right of action has been implied under sections 601 and 901, and that the Supreme
Court in Cannon v. University of Chicago 163 "recognized that Congress, in 1973, was
familiar with, and relied upon, various federal court decisions which had inferred
the existence of a private right of action."' 164 The court saw the 1978 amendments
adding section 505 as an additional expression of legislative intent for a private
right of action. 165 These amendments provided that the remedies under section
504 were those under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act and that in "any action or
proceeding to enforce or charge a violation of a provision of this subchapter," the
court may grant attorneys' fees to the prevailing party. 166
Considering section 503, the Hart court found that there was no contempora-
neous evidence of an intent to create a private right of action, nor an intent to
deny one. Congress, however, obviously assumed the existence of a private right of
action in 1978 when it provided for attorneys' fees. 16 7 The Hart court also noted
that relaxing the legislative intent requirement is appropriate where the private
right of action would enforce civil rights. 168
Some courts have not found that Congress intended a private right of action
under section 503. The Rogers court did not give much weight to the 1978 amend-
ments providing attorneys' fees or to statements made at that time. Although
Congress might have thought there was a private right of action in 1978, the court
did not think that necessarily made it so in 1973.169 The Seventh Circuit in
Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co. 170 suggested that the attorneys' fee provision in sec-
tion 505 only applies to fees incurred when the individual files his complaint with
the Department of Labor, 17 1 not to fees incurred in a private action. The court
was "left without any indication that, contemporaneous with its adoption of sec-
tion 503, Congress intended to extend a private remedy to handicapped individ-
uals allegedly harmed by their employer's failure to comply with his affirmative
action obligation as a federal contractor."'' 72
c. Consistent with Legislative Scheme. The Hart court decided that a private
160. 485 F. Supp. at 70.
161. S. REP. No. 93-1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 97, reprniedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
6373, 6390.
162. Id at 106; 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 6390.
163. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
164. Hart, 485 F. Supp. at 70.
165. Id
166. 29 U.S.C. § 794a (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
167. Hart, 485 F. Supp. at 73-74.
168. 485 F. Supp. at 75.
169. 611 F.2d at 1082.
170. 629 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1980).
171. Id. at 1242.
172. Id at 1243.
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right of action for sections 503 and 504 was consistent with the underlying purpose
of the statute.t7 3 Although a plaintiff must exhaust any administrative procedures
before bringing a suit, the primary administrative remedy was to terminate
funding and the court believed it was "unrealistic to assume that this severe sanc-
tion [would] be freely exercised to remedy individual instances of discrimination.
A private right of action, on the other hand, [could] bring about tailored, indi-
vidual relief."'' 74 The exhaustion requirement coupled with the threat of litigation
might also encourage negotiation and conciliation.1 75
The Fifth and Seventh Circuits have found that since section 503 itself provides
an administrative remedy, a private cause of action is inconsistent with the legisla-
tive scheme.176 Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit found no proof that the admin-
istrative remedy was not sufficient. 77
d Traditona4'y Relegated to the States. This area has not been one traditionally
within the states' powers.178
The enforcement procedures for sections 503 and 504 differ greatly. Section
503 expressly provides an administrative procedure while section 504 merely fol-
lows the procedures set out in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. The wording of
section 504 is patterned after sections 601 and 901, under both of which a private
right of action has been found. Generally, most courts have found an implied
private right of action under section 504, but not under section 503.
2. State Systems. All states which do not have administrative enforcement proce-
dures allow complainants to proceed directly in a civil action. 79 Judicial enforce-
ment is provided by some of the states which have administrative agencies,
although some states express a preference for administrative enforcement, 80 and
others make the initially chosen forum exclusive. 8 1
173. 485 F. Supp. at 71, 75, 76.
174. Id at 71.
175. Id
176. 611 F.2d at 1083; 629 F.2d at 1243.
177. Simpson, 629 F.2d at 1244. See also Wood v. Diamond State Tel. Co., 440 F. Supp. 1003 (D. Del.
1977).
178. Hart, 485 F. Supp. at 69.
179. GA. CODE ANN. § 66-506 (Supp. 1981); TEX. HUM. REs. CODE ANN. § 121.004 (Vernon 1980);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495b (Supp. 1982).
180. IOwA CODE § 601A. 16 (Supp. 1981-82) (complainant must proceed with administrative remedy
before initiating a court action); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4622 (Supp. 1981-82) (providing for a
limitation on damage and attorneys' fees awards for those who initiate a court action without pursuing the
administrative remedy first, as well as allowing priority on the court's docket to those who have tried the
administrative route before proceeding to court).
181. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2556 (1981); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:13 (Supp. 1981); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 10:5-27 (West 1976); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 297(9) (McKinney 1982); OHio REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4112.08 (Page 1980); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 962(b), (c) (Purdon Supp. 1965-81); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-
13 (Supp. 1982).
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REMEDIES
A. Sections 503 and 504
The several statutory remedies take many forms. As discussed above, the
OFCCP and OCR have the power to terminate or suspend federal funds or con-
tract payments. In addition, appropriate remedies may be devised for each situa-
tion. Furthermore, section 505 provides for attorneys' fees to be awarded in "any
action to enforce or charge a violation of a provision of this subchapter." 182
A common remedy for violation of section 503, in addition to reinstatement of
the employee, is back pay.183
The 180 day time limit for filing complaints does not limit back pay awards to 180 days.
Back pay may be awarded for violations that occur up to three years prior to the filing of
the complaint or notification to the contractor if the employer's violation of the statute is
willful. 'The Director of [the OFCCP] defines "willful" as a situation where a contractor
knew or should have known that failure to take remedial action would continue the dis-
criminatory effects.' In cases of nonwillful violations, back pay may be obtained for up to
two years prior to the initial action.
18 4
In 1977, the OFCCP published statistics on the section 503 complaints
received. As of December 10, 1976, 1994 complaints involving 33 major kinds of
physical and mental handicaps had been received. Of these, 204 were settled in
favor of the complainant; 366 were closed because of lack of coverage; 104 were
withdrawn; 180 were found not to be violations; 154 were dismissed because the
complainants did not respond to government follow-up; and 29 were transferred to
another agency, leaving 950 outstanding. 8 5 Handicapped workers collected over
$115,000 in back pay as a remedy for employment discrimination. Awards ranged
from $231 to $12,000.186 The following are examples of cases in which a mentally
ill worker was awarded back pay:
1. A complainant residing in the state of Virginia was awarded $2,631.12 in back
wages by an electric equipment testing company. Complainant was an applicant
for the position of electronic equipment operator trainee. The company felt the
complainant, whose handicap was a manic depressive personality, would be under
inordinate pressure. Complainant's psychiatrist contended that the problem had
remained controlled for two years with medication. Complainant accepted an
alternative position with the company at the same rate of pay, plus company bene-
fits, in addition to the back pay.8 7
2. An industrial equipment company awarded $1,362.34 in back pay to a com-
plainant residing in Texas. Because the complainant was mentally unstable, he
had been demoted from the position of field salesman to a clerical position. In
182. 29 U.S.C. § 794a(b) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
183. No information was discovered which stated expressly that a plaintiff could recover back pay
under § 504. However, when cases speak of damages, it is assumed that back pay is at least part of them.
184. 4 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 337 (1980).
185. J. NORTHRUP, OLD AGE, HANDICAPPED AND VIETNAM-ERA ANTIDISCRIMINATION LEGisLA-
TION 88 (1977).
186. 1977 LAB. REL. Y.B. 363.
187. J. NORTHRUP, supra note 185, at 92.
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addition to back wages, he was included in the company profit sharing. Com-
plainant did not wish to be rehired.18 8
3. A complainant residing in Texas was awarded $419.00 in back wages. The
complainant, who suffered from emotional illness, was aware that his position
would be eliminated. The company terminated him sooner than expected, how-
ever, thus eliminating a Christmas bonus.18 9
4. A complainant, employed by a California city as a painter, was discharged
because of psychiatric problems. Upon investigation, the complainant was rehired
and awarded back wages in the amount of $4,164.00.190
5. A complainant residing in Arizona, who had previously suffered mental ill-
ness, was awarded $2,916.00 in back pay, expurgation of personnel records, and
employment in a position for which he had applied, by an aircraft company.191
B. State Remedies
Whether an individual proceeds through an administrative agency or a court
action, the remedies provided by statute are generally the same from state to state
and resemble those of the federal system.l 9 2 The statutes provide a number of
specific remedies, and also grant the hearing body latitude to impose additional or
differing remedies appropriate for the particular situation. Specified remedies
include: hiring, reinstatement, upgrading, admission to training programs, bene-
fits, back pay, costs, and reasonable attorneys' fees.
With respect to damages, the statutes take varying positions. For example,
Indiana restricts damages to lost wages, salaries, commissions, and fringe bene-
fits. 193 Minnesota allows not only damages for mental anguish and suffering, but
also allows punitive damages not exceeding $6,000 in cases of willful violation. 194
Maine imposes an increasing scale of penal damages in which an employer pays
$100 for its first violation, $250 for its second violation, and $1,000 for each suc-
ceeding violation. 195
Finally, certain employers may be penalized to a far greater extent than their
liability to the aggrieved individual. If the business is licensed by the state, the
188. Id at 94.
189. Id. at 95.
190. Id at 97.
191. Id at 98.
192. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-82 (West Supp. 1982); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2553 (1981); GA. CODE
ANN. § 66-506 (Supp. 1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, § 8-108 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-83); IND. CODE
ANN. § 22-9-1-6(k)(1) (Bums Supp. 1982); IOWA CODE § 601A.15(8) (Supp. 1982-83); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 5, §4613(2) (1979); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 11(e) (1979); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 37.2605(2) (Supp. 1982-83); MINN. STAT. § 363.071(2)(a) (Supp. 1981); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-506
(1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1119(3) (1978); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:9(II) (1966); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 10:5-17 (West Supp. 1982-83); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-11(E) (1978); N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 297(4)(c)
(McKinney 1982); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4112.05(G), 4112.02(N) (Page 1980 & Supp. 1982); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 959, 962(c) (Purdon Supp. 1965-81); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 28-5-24, 24.1 (Supp. 1981);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-50-103 (1980); TEx. HUM. REs. CODE ANN. § 121.004 (Vernon 1980); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 34-35-7(12) (Supp. 1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495(b) (Supp. 1982); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-10
(1979); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.39(4)(c) (West Supp. 1982-83).
193. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 22-9-1-6(k)(1), 12.1(c)(8) (Burns Supp. 1982).
194. MINN. STAT. § 363.071(2) (Supp. 1981).
195. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4613(7) (Supp. 1981-82).
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violation may be considered by the licensing agency.196 Similarly, the state may
refuse to grant the employer any public contracts for a fixed period of time fol-
lowing any violation of the employment discrimination statute.' 9 7
VI
CONCLUSION
The 1970's witnessed unprecedented federal and state legislative concern for
the difficulties faced by mentally ill persons who seek to become integrated mem-
bers of the working world. Of course this concern and its statutory evidence did
not appear suddenly. They were the product of a long-developing trend rooted in
the improved therapeutic techniques which have enabled substantial numbers of
mentally ill persons to function in ways that would previously have been prevented
by their sickness.
It is one thing to recognize significant legislative efforts to fashion laws-prohib-
iting illogical and invidious discrimination against mentally ill persons, and it is
quite another to evaluate the utility of such legislation in the absence of case law
interpreting and applying the statutes. An explanation of why so few employment
cases have been litigated on behalf of the mentally ill would provide excellent clues
in the quest to discover how this long-downtrodden group has fared in the labor
market. However, an attempt to uncover the reason why so few public interest
lawyers have taken up the banner of the mentally ill in the employment realm
necessitates the construction of a double-helix chain of causation more complex
than DNA itself. Suffice it to say that legislation is now in place which illustrates
concern for the mentally ill beyond the treatment setting. Legal practitioners,
mental health administrators, and therapists must now work together to breathe
life into the mental health employment legislation, and make the lofty goals,
hopes, and dreams embodied in the legislation become a reality.
196. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2557 (1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, § 8-109(B) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-
83); IOWA CODE § 601A.15(8)(b)(l) (Supp. 1981); MINN. STAT. § 363.071(4) (Supp. 1981); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 43, § 959 (Purdon Supp. 1965-81).
197. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, § 8-109(A) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-83); IOWA CODE § 601A.15(b)(2)(3)
(Supp. 1981); MINN. STAT. § 363.071(5) (Supp. 1981).
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